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Living outside the system? The (im)morality of urban squatting after the Land
Registration Act 2002
(1) Introduction
The legal concept of "squatting" refers to the unauthorised occupation of land belonging to another. In the words of Lord Denning: "…a squatter…is one who, without colour of right, enters on an unoccupied house or land, intending to stay there as long as he can."
1 In social and political discourse in this country, however, the term tends to be associated specifically with the deliberate occupation of empty residential buildings in metropolitan areas -often colloquially described as "urban squatting". At various points in history, particularly during the 1960s and 1970s, urban squatting has been regarded as a serious social problem. Nevertheless, and despite the popular perception of urban squatting as a criminal activity, often criticised as being tantamount to "land theft", squatting, per se, is not a criminal offence.
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Rather, the urban squatter, like other types of squatter, is regulated predominately through the civil law: for example, when landowners seek to utilise the law to remove squatters, they must pursue their action through the civil court by issuing a claim for the recovery of land. 3 Most landowners who bring such an action are assured of legal protection so long as they can show good title to the land. Even still, the very fact that squatters may "get away with" occupying property without 5 the registered proprietor can formally object to the squatter"s claim, 11 and by doing so prevent the registration of the squatter as proprietor of the land. Crucially, this procedure provides the land owner with an opportunity to recover possession of the property before the squatter"s occupation has given rise to any claim on the title to the land.
These reforms are striking, not least because the doctrine of adverse possession by limitation of actions had long been regarded as a relatively stable and, for many, justifiable feature of the property law system. Without a doubt, this dramatic departure was primarily motivated by the demands of title registration, since acquisition of title through adverse possession was seen to undermine the security of the Land Register as the ultimate source of information about land ownership.
However, this article seeks to challenge the hegemony of land registration objectives within the Commission"s analysis. Indeed, the Commission itself had previously stated that: "…any substantive reform of [adverse possession] should be undertaken separately and ought not to be conditioned purely by registered conveyancing considerations." 12 Nevertheless, in 2001, after conducting a process of consultation (to which a slight majority (60%) of those who responded supported the proposed reforms "in principle" 13 ) and with an acknowledgement of disquiet concerning the 11 LRA 2002, Sch 6, para 3. Registration will only proceed, notwithstanding objection, if the squatter can establish an estoppel in his or her favour, an entitlement to be registered as proprietor by some other reason -for example, under a will or intestacy, or by virtue of an estate contract, or if the matter is a boundary dispute; LRA 2002, Sch 6, para 5.
12 Law Commission, Third Report on Land Registration (Law Com No 158, 1987) , para 2.36. The Law Commission"s ultimate objective was to prevent adverse occupiers from successfully securing title where landowners had failed to engage in adequate supervision of their properties. The dangers of the old law for landowners had been highlighted by a series of high profile media reports, where squatters acquired the title to extremely valuable properties after landowners failed to evict them before the limitation period had expired.
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Of course, deliberate adverse possession is not simply the preserve of the "urban squatter". However, the Commission appeared to be heavily influenced by media criticisms of cases involving local government, particularly some London borough councils, in which title to valuable housing had been lost to urban squatters. 17 As one commentator has noted: " [t] he popular press has seized on recent cases involving local authorities where "undeserving" squatters obtained title through long possession, as an example of the law being an ass." 18 14 "If the reports in the press are any kind of barometer, there would appear to be considerable public disquiet with the way that the law on adverse possession presently operates."; ibid.
7 Against the intensity of the opprobrium levelled against urban squatters in the media, the combined effect of relativity of title and the principle of limitation of actions, which gave rise to an apparent preference for the claims of squatters, over and above the interests of landowners,had become an awkward position to defend.
So far as the legal academy is concerned, the effective abolition of the doctrine of adverse possession has attracted surprisingly little critical attention. Martin Dixon, for example, has described himself as being: " ( However, the Commission failed to carry out anything like an adequate assessment of the vast body of literature on this subject, resorting instead to a "common sense" approach to the issue that revolved around the key importance of the Land Register in ensuring certainty of title in a system of registered land and the ethical distinction that was drawn between "good faith" and "bad faith" squatters. To illustrate the limits of the Law Commission"s economic and moral analysis this article argues that the Law Commission has (unhelpfully) essentialised the problem of squatting. It has failed to consider fully the wide variety of types of squatter and the varying types of moral and economic arguments that relate to each of these categories. The application of the LRA 2002 reforms to the particular paradigm of the urban squatter provides a useful 21 See above, n6.
9 lens through which to view the limitations of the Commission"s analysis of the problem.
(2) The doctrine of adverse possession
Before the enactment of the LRA 2002, the doctrine of adverse possession, based on the principle of limitation, gave rise to similar results in registered and unregistered land. In unregistered land, twelve years" adverse possession led to the extinguishment of the paper owner"s title, and the squatter"s common law estate grew out of his possession of the land. So too, on a successful application from a squatter in registered land, the registered proprietor"s title was closed, and a new title opened for the squatter: although registration was necessary to complete the squatter"s legal title, the squatter acquired beneficial ownership of the property automatically, under a statutory trust. Furthermore, the doctrine was, at least in relation to unregistered land, traditionally regarded as striking a reasonable balance between, on the one hand, the rights of the landowner -whose claim, after 12 years, was regarded as "stale", and the squatter -whose long possession of the property was recognised on grounds of both morality and economic and transactional efficiency. 23 The importance of settling claims to land ownership, as well as the perceived investment, both emotional and economic, made by the squatter in the property during the limitation period, were seen to justify the acquisition of ownership rights by the squatter after the designated time It is of course doubtless the case that the traditional justifications on "saleability", set out in (2) and (4), were met by the Law Commission"s counter-argument, that:
here title is registered, adverse possession facilitates deduction of title only in relation to those matters on which the register is not conclusive." 34 Much more contentious, however, was the Commission"s approach to the concept of fairness.
The first component of the Commission"s argument sought to highlight the "undeserving" nature of many claims for title through adverse possession. It accepted 32 Ibid, paras 10.6-10.9.
33 Ibid, para 10.13. 34 Ibid, para 10.10. It is, however, suggested below that the Law Commission failed to consider the full implications of its proposals for the saleability of property; see below, section 5.
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the importance of protecting certain categories of "inadvertent" squatter from hardship, for example, those operating under a reasonable mistake as to boundaries, as noted in justification (3), above, on the basis that: "[i]n these cases we think the squatter, whose conduct has been perfectly reasonable, should prevail over the registered proprietor". 35 In contrast to this, however, the Commission was highly critical of those squatters who deliberately take possession of land, and reasoned that:
t is, of course, remarkable that the law is prepared to legitimise such "possession of wrong" which, at least in some cases, is tantamount to sanctioning a theft of land."
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The law of theft in the United Kingdom requires the dishonest appropriation of property belonging to another with the intention to permanently to deprive another of it. 37 To be guilty of theft, the individual defendant must know that the property belongs to another, and the "land theft" approach to adverse possession extends this analysis to the knowingly unauthorised use of land. The idea that law would legitimate this "land theft" through a transfer of title was described as "distasteful".
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Significantly, by focusing upon the construction of advertent squatting as "land theft", proposed an exception to deal with this scenario. More importantly though, noting in particular the argument in justification (1), above, that the principle of limitation is intended to bar claimants from "sleeping on their rights", the Commission pointed out that landowners who lose title to deliberate squatters are often unaware of the presence of squatters on their property until it is too late. In these circumstancesdeliberate squatting unnoticed as a result of the inadvertence of the landowner -the Commission considered it unfair to allow a squatter to gain title to the property.
Indeed, this concern with the problem of effective supervision was central to the Law Commission"s rationale for the curtailment of adverse possession in registered land. 
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The Law Commission alluded to two circumstances in which a landowner might not realise that deliberate squatting is taking place on his property. On the one hand, the landowner may be unaware of the presence of a squatter since squatting: "…can take place without it being readily detectable." 41 Deliberate squatters wishing to remain undisturbed often "make concerted efforts to remain invisible to avoid eviction".
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This also ran counter to one of the overarching aims of the Law Commission"s reform proposals, which sought to minimise the circumstances in which "undiscoverable" interests would be binding on a purchaser of land. 43 The second, and arguably more important issue identified by the Law Commission was the problem of "forgotten properties". Properties may become "forgotten" whenever a landowner fails to maintain effective scrutiny over the land and consequently does not realise that reasonably careful inspection of the land"; para 2(c)(i). Similarly, in relation to those legal easements which are now overriding, the idea that the easements were "obvious on a reasonably careful inspection of the land" is also added through para 3(1)(b).
squatting is taking place there. 44 Failure to keep property under scrutiny can mean that squatters are able to deliberately occupy premises unnoticed for considerable periods. Prior to the LRA 2002, this could also lead, ultimately, to the possibility of the squatter mounting a successful claim for title by adverse possession.
For the Law Commission, the problem of forgotten properties was one for which landowners were regarded as blameless. The proposals were intended to protect large landowners who "own numerous and perhaps widely scattered parcels of land for which they may have no present use, and which they cannot keep under regular scrutiny". 45 The clear (and contentious) moral implication here -that landowners cannot rather than simply do not supervise their properties effectively -reinforces the view that they should not be punished for inadequate supervision by losing title to their land. The LRA 2002 was specifically designed to protect registered proprietors from the possibility of such oversight or inadvertence. Indeed, bearing in mind the Law Commission"s objectives in respect of avoiding "land theft", these procedures are apt and effective. Since it is now impossible for a squatter to gain title to registered property without first notifying the landowner, the situation in which a landowner remains unaware of the presence of squatters until it is too late is entirely avoided.
Yet, while this outcome clearly satisfies the Law Commission"s agenda in relation to transactional and economic efficiency, this article argues that the moral stance adopted by the Commission to bolster these reforms requires further exegesis. The following sections scrutinize the moral outlook adopted by the Law Commission by 44 Of course, this can also happen on a much smaller scale, although inadvertently, when the squatter and the landowner are mistaken as to boundary lines.
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focusing on the case of deliberate squatters who make their homes in unsupervised properties.
(3) The paradigm of the urban squatter in "forgotten" properties (a) Who is the urban squatter?
The phenomenon of widespread urban squatting first became evident in the UK in the periods following both the first and second world wars. It was during the 1960s and In an effort to explain the disproportionate presence of urban squatters in local authority properties, it has been suggested that the practical benefits of targeting such properties include the greater ease with which potential squatters can identify empty properties in the public sector, and the fact that squatters were less likely to be secretly and illegally evicted by force by a local authority. 71 The tendency for urban squatters to occupy empty local authority properties is also explicable (historically at least) on ideological grounds, on the basis that the local authority has a duty to house the homeless. Perhaps most importantly, however, council housing may also appear an attractive prospect for urban squatters since local authorities are more likely to own large numbers of non-transactional properties, which are liable to become "forgotten".
Indeed, this is clearly the type of property that historically has been most frequently targeted by urban squatters. As Pritchard noted in the 1970s, the most frequent victim of squatting was "the local authority or other person or body that has acquired the 25 example, if the owner lives abroad. Such properties are now likely to be equally attractive to urban squatters seeking to identify an empty property which they can occupy, and in which they are likely to go undisturbed, for the time being at least.
(4) The "immorality" of the urban squatter
The new regime for adverse possession in registered land, as set out by the Law Commission and implemented through the LRA, adopted a clear moral view on "advertent squatters", as the prospect that the urban squatter could acquire the title to land automatically, on the expiry of the limitation period, was deemed to be inherently unfair. There were two elements to this rationale: first, that unlike other types of inadvertent trespasser, urban squatters were identified as immoral because they deliberately occupied property which they knew did not belong to them; and secondly, that the landowner who failed to effectively supervise his property was to be regarded as blameless, even though he or she had failed to identify and/or remove squatters who were occupying their property within the limitation period. When considering the Law Commission"s policy stance on squatting, Dixon has noted that:
"the point…is not that the provisions of the LRA 2002 are flawed or misguided. They reflect powerful arguments of policy and, while not everyone may agree with them, those arguments cannot be dismissed lightly." 77 It is suggested, however, that the Law Commission"s moral stance on urban squatters played an important role in excluding -and, for the future, avoiding -any further consideration of the ideological arguments surrounding squatting and adverse possession. The complex philosophical and jurisprudential issues at stake were reduced to two simple "facts": (1) acquisition of 77 Dixon, above n15, p153.
title through adverse possession is incompatible with title registration; and (2) squatters act immorally by trespassing on other people"s land. The final step for the Law Commission was to lightly dismiss the notion that squatting should be supported, or even tolerated, by law at all.
This simplistic account of the competing interests at stake when balancing the squatter"s possession against the landowner"s right to ownership prioritises transactional efficiency, bolstered by the position that advertent squatters are morally blameworthy, while landowners are morally blameless. This position can be challenged on two grounds: for one thing, the Law Commission"s moral stance on advertent squatting was assumed without any explicit consideration of the vast body of philosophical and jurisprudential debate that has surrounded the morality of squatting. In addition to this, the narrow parameters of the Law Commission"s analysis failed to recognise that the phenomenon of squatting must be located within a broader systemic framework, in relation to both the extrinsic factors that encourage urban squatting -for example, rising house prices, inadequate supply of affordable housing, and a high volume of empty properties -and the systemic consequences of both squatting itself, and the legal regulation of property rights through adverse possession, for the housing market. The Law Commission"s moral essentialism foreclosed any consideration of these important issues.
The Law Commission"s proposals implicitly constructed the moral debate over the doctrine of adverse possession around a binary division between "good faith" and "bad faith" squatters. Yet, while the "land theft" approach to adverse possession appears, prima facie, to provide a convincing justificatory basis for the Law Commission"s agenda in relation to registered land, the Commission should not simply be accepted as having had the final word on the morality of "bad faith" squatting, particularly in light of its apparent lack of engagement with the traditional justificatory theories. The actions of the "bad-faith" squatter in an unsupervised property can be usefully conceptualised through the alternative perspectives of labour-desert theory, personhood theory, and moral utilitarianism. Each of these frameworks allows for the possibility that, in certain contexts -specifically, in the case of an advertent squatterthe consequences of unauthorised occupation by a squatter may negate the original title-holder"s moral claim, and provide a moral justification for the conduct of the squatter. The case of urban squatters, who make their homes in unsupervised properties, brings this balance into sharp relief.
Locke"s labour-desert theory is grounded in the idea that natural rights to land can be acquired through productive use. 78 Locke was primarily concerned with justifications for the acquisition of first ownership rights in un-owned or "natural property", and he emphasised the need to reward the person who makes the highest and best use of the land: "…the useful labourer rather than the sluggard…" 79 Of course, a fundamental difficulty, when it comes to applying this approach to adverse possession is the fact that the land is already owned by the title holder and, as such, cannot be construed as "natural property" in the Lockean sense. However, this hurdle might arguably be overcome by treating the title-holder"s neglect of the land as a form of quasi-78 J Locke, Second Treatise on Government (Oxford: Blackwell, 1966 Against this argument, it should be noted that, in some cases, properties may be left empty, undeveloped and in a state of disrepair because the landowner, rather than abandoning the property, has future plans for the development of the land. The argument that the landowner"s future plans for the use of land precludes the acquisition of title by the squatter has emerged intermittently in judicial decisions, 83 At first sight, the idea that legal policy supports the landowner"s decision to leave the property empty appears to run contrary to the Government"s current agenda in relation to empty properties, particularly empty homes. 84 It should be noted, however that the strategy of bringing empty properties back into use was not viewed by the Government as a justification for squatting:
rather, the presence of squatters was seen as an obstacle in the path of local authorities who are seeking to identify empty properties, 85 and re-allocate those empty homes according to statutory principles.
Another perspective from which to view the morality of he urban squatter is to apply Radin"s "personhood" theory, which drew on Hegel"s justification for private property, 86 emphasised the relationship that develops between the individual and certain items of property that become constitutive of their personhood, and argues that these relationships should be protected because: "…to achieve proper selfdevelopment -to be a person -an individual needs some control over resources in the external environment." 87 The theory of "property for personhood" clearly supports the idea that the value that the property represents to the urban squatter as a home might give rise to some moral claim in relation to the property, particularly against a neglectful landowner. In Radin"s analysis, the function of the personhood perspective was to: "…serve as an explicit source of values for making moral distinctions in property disputes, and hence for either justifying or criticizing current law"; 88 and
property that was occupied as a home was identified as a quintessential example of "worthy" property.
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The proposition that investing one"s self in property gives rise to a moral claim against that property may justify some moral claim on the part of urban squatters who occupy empty properties as their homes. Conversely, title-holders who leave their properties unused and unsupervised, may have ownership of the thing, but do not make use of the thing -a relationship that Hegel described as "empty proprietorship"
and thus as a "madness of personality". 89 Radin described different forms of property as being located on a continuum, ranging from property that is constitutive of personhood (described as "personal property") to property that carries no meaning beyond its capital value (described as "fungible property"). Radin argued that: "…in our social context a house that is owned by someone who resides there is generally understood to be towards the personal end of the continuum."; ibid, p54. For a detailed discussion of the applicability of "property for Radin"s theory of "property for personhood" offers an interesting alternative perspective on the relative moral claims of urban squatters, who make their homes in empty properties, and neglectful landowners. It is certainly arguable that the squatter"s relationship with the land may garner moral approbation on the basis that the squatter"s interest in the property is personal, while the absentee landowner"s claim is towards the fungible end of the continuum. One problem, however, is that while Hegel, on the one hand, was concerned with the first acquisition of ownership interests, Radin presumed that the claimant seeking to assert personal property in an asset would already be the owner of that asset, and would be seeking to defend that ownership against third party claims (for example, eminent domain). Furthermore, even allowing unauthorised occupation to found the basis for a personhood claim, in striking a balance between the competing interests of the squatter and the landowner, it would be necessary to demonstrate that the threat to the personhood of the squatter outweighs the personhood invested by a particular landowner in that property, and 91 Radin, above n88, p44.
92 Ibid.
93 Ibid, p54.
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this also depends upon an assumption that the landowner has no "personal" interest in the property because he or she is out of possession.
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For the landowner"s personhood in the property to be reduced to the point that a squatter could claim superior title, the landowner must no longer believe in his or her ownership of the property, for example, when a squatter occupies a property that has been literally "forgotten" by the landowner. 95 Of course, there have been reported cases in which urban squatters have acquired title to properties belonging to local authorities who had no knowledge of their ownership. 96 However, this argument is less persuasive in the more usual case, in which individual landowners are aware of their ownership of property, but do not realise that a squatter is in occupation. In such circumstances it is much more difficult to conclude that the landowner"s own personhood has been extinguished. Yet, it is important to bear in mind the context of this discussion: even if it were accepted (for the sake of argument) that the personhood approach does not suffice to justify re-distribution of title in favour of squatters who occupy property as their home, it is arguable at least that the (im)morality of squatting raises complex jurisprudential issues, which were not admitted under the Law Commission"s agenda against adverse possession in registered land. 94 Stake, above n6, p2456. Note, however, Posner"s argument that: "Over time, a person becomes attached to property that he regards as his own, and the deprivation of the property would be wrenching. Over the same time, a person loses attachment to property that he regards as no longer his own, and the restoration of the property would cause only moderate pleasure."; R Posner, Economic 
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Finally, it is arguable that the (im)morality of the urban squatter, as well as the case for protecting neglectful landowners can be usefully viewed through the lens of moral utilitarianism. Some commentators have argued that a utilitarian moral assessment, which prefers the outcome that achieves the maximum overall benefit for both landowner and squatter, may justify the squatter"s on-going use of the property, or even the acquisition of title through adverse possession, because the squatter has a greater need than the landowner in relation to this property. This argument seems particularly persuasive when applied to a homeless squatter and a landowner who has no present use for the property. It is arguable that a squatter who occupies property as a home will inevitably have more need for the property than a landowner who is not using the property. 97 From this perspective, it is possible to distinguish different types of squatters, from those who extend the boundaries of their existing properties (who are, for one thing, already landowners and who are more likely to be of similar socioeconomic circumstances to the landowners they dispossess), to those who take possession of large tracts of rural land, who may put the property to use for farming, but are not necessarily property-less, to urban squatters, who are more likely to occupy empty property because of need.
It is interesting to note that the Law Commission did not view all urban squatters as mere opportunists, but did, to some extent, acknowledge the possible relevance of use value to an urban squatter. In Land Registration for the Twenty-First Century, the 97 Of course, Stake also challenges this model for the apparent licensing of theft on grounds of an individual"s relative poverty, together with the increases, once again, in costs of monitoring and protection of property; above, n6, p2458.
Law Commission recognised that unlawful occupation may sometimes arise from acute housing need, expressing "understandable sympathy" for homeless squatters who took possession of empty properties as a matter of necessity. 98 However, the Law Commission swiftly by-passed this issue by claiming that the proportion of claims brought by this type of squatter was relatively small, and that: "…the much more typical case in practice is the landowner with an eye to the main chance, who encroaches on his or her neighbour"s land." 99 Yet, the moral blame attributed to advertent squatting which, although arguably motivated by need, was labelled "land theft", compared to the forbearance shown to those who acted under a mistake as to boundaries, suggests that the Commission"s "sympathy" was extremely limited.
Fennell has argued that there is an important class distinction between "good faith" inadvertent squatters and "bad faith" advertent squatters:
"The prototype squatter is poor and landless. People who own no land cannot mistakenly believe that the land they are occupying is their own. In this regard, a good faith requirement is distributively conservative, designed to benefit only the already-landed."
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Fennell went on to argue that, rather than labelling inadvertent squatters as "good faith" squatters, and advertent squatters as "bad faith" squatters, a justified advertent squatter could be re-conceived as a "higher-valuing user" of the land, who commits an "efficient trespass". 101 Although this argument could, controversially, be employed to 98 Law Com No 271, above n13, para 2.70. 99 Ibid. 100 Fennell, above n6, p98.
101 Ibid.
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suggest that acquisition of title through adverse possession could provide a vehicle for property re-distribution, it also brings under question the argument that a squatter can never obtain a superior title after deliberately taking possession of another person"s land because they are guilty of blameworthy conduct. Fennell argued that evidence of advertence (or bad faith) should not, in itself, be sufficient to preclude a claim to land, since the value that the land holds for the squatter might be so much greater than its value for the landowner as to justify the award of title to the squatter.
In addition to its economic implications, this is also simultaneously and implicitly a moral argument. For one thing, Fennell"s construction of squatters as "higher-valuing users" implicitly suggests a moral view on the question of who is a more deserving user of the property between the squatter and the landowner. Furthermore, by focusing on the idea of "market failure" (ie, the inability to buy the land) as the explanation for the squatter"s trespass, this analysis does not attribute "blame" on the urban squatter. Rather, the phenomenon of squatting is presented as a consequence of the broader housing market trends, such as those that have been associated with high levels of advertent urban squatting, particularly in London: that is, rising house prices, depleted stocks of affordable housing and a high volume of empty properties.
(5) The "morality" of the neglectful landowner 41 may have been in occupation of the property. The squatter"s application for title will be subject to the registered proprietor"s power of veto; 111 in fact, where a property owner has failed to oversee the property, the service of notice following an application by the squatter would actually assist large-scale landowners in identifying squatters on their land. Unfortunately, however, the paradigm of the urban squatter also highlights some significant "knock-on" effects of this legislation. Once again, the problem with the Law Commission"s proposals is that they adopt an essentialist view of the squatter. The LRA 2002 appears to rest upon the portrayal of deliberate squatters as acquisitive individuals, who squat on land for the purposes of acquiring title to the property. Under the LRA 2002, urban squatters can only obtain title if they are willing to make themselves known to the landowner by applying to be registered and, by doing so, to expose themselves to the risk of eviction. To do so, one would think, the squatter would have to be strongly motivated towards securing legal title to the property.
It cannot be assumed, however, that the object of adverse possession for the urban squatter is the acquisitive goal of moving from possession to title. In fact, in perhaps the majority of cases the urban squatter"s objective is not to acquire ownership of the property, as registered proprietor, but rather to remain in occupation of the property, for the time being: instead of "squatting for title", the urban squatter "squats for use".
This view of the urban squatter is supported by Green, who characterised urban squatters are "those who use someone else"s land but who do not necessarily want to 111 Except in the limited circumstances outlined above, see n11 and associated text.
become the "owners" of it". 112 Indeed, Prichard went further yet in assuming that an urban squatter "will rarely be contemplating, and still less often be wishing, to acquire ownership by limitation". 113 Rather than viewing the property as an asset, the urban squatter"s interest lies with the temporary use and occupation of the property, usually as a home. The problem with this construction of the urban squatter is that, if squatters rationalise the use of forgotten properties in this way, there could be an important "knock-on" effect following the enactment of the LRA 2002. Viewed through the lens of "squatting for use", the LRA 2002 may have some unfortunateand perhaps unanticipated -implications for the effective management of "forgotten"
properties.
For an urban squatter who values the use rather than the title of property, however, it will clearly be more rational to remain outside the system than to lodge a notice, thus For the land owner of a forgotten property, the impact of the LRA 2002 is the shift from a situation in which the landowner becomes aware of the squatter but loses title to the land after 12 years undiscovered occupation, to a system in which the landowner retains his title, but potentially fails to recover the use of the land, since the incentive for the squatter is to stay outside the system. Of course, the primary objectives of the LRA 2002 in relation to adverse possession related to squatting for title, rather than squatting for use. Furthermore, the problem of "land theft" by urban squatters has clearly been solved, in that title is not lost, and to this end, the Act has succeeded in protecting the title of land owners: the squatter who remains in quiet occupation, enjoying squatting for use, will never be able to gain title, but remains at permanent risk of identification and eviction from the premises. Furthermore, so far as the system of title registration is concerned, whether the land owner has "forgotten" a property or not, so long as title is registered the information remains lodged with the Land Registry. Whether the land owner has "forgotten" about a property or not, the bureaucratic goals of title registration are satisfied.
Nevertheless, it is arguable that the procedure by which adverse possession is governed under the LRA may have wider, negative consequences in relation to the use of land. Although the Land Registry "knows" who owns the property, if the landowner has "forgotten" the property, and the squatter can neither obtain the title through a claim in adverse possession by mere effluxion of time, nor is likely to jeopardise ongoing use by applying to be registered and thus providing a signal to the landowner, there is a potential danger that the land could become economically and physically sterile. The Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, in the context of its "Empty Homes" project, has identified a range of negative effects linked with "forgotten properties", including wasted financial resources for the Local Authority and owners; increased dereliction, vandalism, litter and, in extreme cases, arson;
reduced market values in neighbouring properties and the wider area; and impacts on local businesses through reduced demand for goods and services, as well as potential knock-on effects -in areas of low demand -on the viability of public services, such as schools.
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It is also important to bear in mind the welfare and housing consequences of on-going occupation by squatters in unsupervised properties. The pressing need for new residential accommodation across the country, and particularly in London, has prompted a drive to bring forgotten properties back into the market. As the discussion above has noted, the significance of properties falling outside the market was brought into sharp relief by the Government"s "Empty Homes" initiative. This would also mean that while squatters benefit from the use of the property -until the landowner discovers them -without title, they will be unable to dispose of the property. Since the squatter has no prospect of acquiring title, there will be less incentive to improve or maintain the property. Of course, the squatter remains at permanent risk of discovery by the landowner. In such cases, the absence of title will ensure that any challenge to their occupation is likely to be successful, that the landowner will regain possession, and the property will once again be brought into the 115 Ibid, Ministerial Foreword, p4.
46 market. In the meantime, however, the attractiveness of "squatting for use" as opposed to "squatting for title", combined with the notice requirements under the LRA, will mean that for non-acquisitive squatters the possibility of remaining undiscovered will be preferable to risking loss of use.
(7) Conclusions
The object of the LRA 2002 was to: "…mak[e] dealings in land much simpler, quicker and cheaper…mean [ing] that both title to registered land and the rights in and over it will be more secure…"; 116 and there can be little doubt that the aim of ensuring that landowners will not be susceptible to threats to title unless they no longer care to defend their ownership has -subject to limited exceptions -been broadly achieved.
However, looking beyond the question of title, the reforms to the law of adverse possession achieved by the LRA can also be located within broader social, economic, moral and cultural contexts. The paradigm of the "urban squatter" provides an interesting lens through which to trace the impacts of these reforms, both intended and unintended. One consequence, which appears to have been intended, is the new and apparently unimpeachable moral stance adopted by the Law Commission towards advertent squatters. Despite the importance of macro-economic factors including rising house prices, low availability of affordable housing and a high volume of empty properties, from the new phraseology of adverse possession as "land theft", to the characterisation of squatters as primarily "landowners with an eye to the main chance", 117 the Law Commission has clearly identified squatters as morally 47 "blameworthy". Meanwhile, the absentee landowners of unsupervised properties have been constructed as blameless. Yet, this simplistic account of the moral issues at stake in relation to both squatting and adverse possession fails to reflect the complexities involved in striking a balance between advertent squatters and neglectful land owners, as well as failing to take account of the knock-on effects of squatting for use for the property market and the housing market.
The LRA 2002 has, by and large, ensured that a squatter"s occupation will not be capable of maturing into title without an application to the Land Registry, at which point the landowner will be served with notice and will have a power of veto over the transfer of title to the squatter. However, the LRA will also have practical significance outside the realm of title, in the function of the new regime as a disincentive to undisturbed squatters in undiscovered occupation of forgotten properties, to declare themselves and seek legitimisation of their occupation. The LRA allows the landowner the opportunity to object to the registration of the squatter"s title, however long the squatter has been in possession, and, subsequently, to bring an action to recover the land from the squatter. Consequently, the preferable course of action for the urban squatter, on the presumption that they are likely to value continued use and occupation, over an action for title that is probably doomed to fail, must be to protect their future use of the property for as long as possible by staying outside the system. Furthermore, so long as these empty properties are occupied by squatters, it is more difficult for local authorities to identify and appropriate them for re-use through the Government"s "Empty Homes" strategy. While these considerations were arguably outside the remit of consideration for the drafters of the LRA, it is suggested that while the registered proprietor"s title is protected by these 48 reforms, there may also be an adverse effect when it comes to the identification and allocation of "forgotten" properties occupied by urban squatters who are happy to live outside the system.
It is also important to recognise that the Law Commission"s approach to the issue of adverse possession was supported by a very clear and decisive policy agenda, not only in relation to title by registration, but also in relation to the construction of the advertent squatter as a blameworthy individual, in contrast to its construction of landowners who fail to supervise their land as blameless and deserving of law"s protection. By adopting this position, without any explicit consideration of the complexities of urban squatting, or the matrix of moral issues at stake in cases involving squatting, the Law Commission appeared to close off any prospect of further debate on the subject. Yet, reports indicating significant increases in the incidences of urban squatting suggest the converse: that it is now apposite to reconsider the wide range of issues surrounding urban squatters, from the philosophical and moral construction of the squatter, to the social, cultural, economic and housing implications of deliberate unlawful occupation in empty residential properties.
